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Toward an Epistemology of
Mysticism: Knowing God as Mystery

Theresa Weynand Tobin
Philosophy Department, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Abstract: While some philosophers suggest that mystical experience may
provide evidence for belief in God, skeptics doubt that there is adequate
warrant for even accepting the claim of a mystical experience as evidence for
anything, except perhaps for some kind of mental instability. Drawing from
the work of Gabriel Marcel, I argue that the pervasive philosophical
skepticism about the evidential status of mystical experiences is misguided
because it rests on too narrow a view about ways of knowing and about what
can count as evidence for belief in the divine. I illustrate the advantages of
Marcel’s approach by applying it to the respective spiritual journeys of
Augustine of Hippo and Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali. I then argue that
Marcel’s framework improves on contemporary analytic approaches because it
captures more accurately the kind of knowledge that mystical experiences
convey as reported by the subjects who claim to have them.
In our Western academic philosophy . . . it is said that religion is a
refuge for those who because of weakness of intellect or character are
unable to confront the stern realities of the world. The objective,
mature, strong attitude is to hold beliefs solely on the basis of
evidence.”
—Norman Malcolm, “The Groundlessness of Religious Belief”1
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People who claim to have had mystical experiences often
describe these experiences as noetic. To say that a mystical
experience is noetic is to say that it conveys some kind of insight or
knowledge. Monica Furlong notes that one common denominator
shared by male and female mystics from across the centuries and
across religious traditions is “the conviction that there is a reality, a
profound meaning, behind the world of appearances. . . . They often
give the name God to that reality.”2 Claims about the noetic character
of mystical experiences do not fit easily into the dominant
epistemological frameworks of contemporary analytic philosophy.
While a small handful of philosophers have suggested that mystical
experience may provide evidence for belief in God, at least for the
subjects of those experiences, this suggestion is not taken very
seriously in wider circles.3 Skeptics doubt that there is warrant even
for accepting the claim of a mystical experience as evidence for
anything, except perhaps for some kind of mental weakness or
instability.
Drawing from the work of Gabriel Marcel, a twentieth-century
French existentialist, I argue that this pervasive skepticism about the
evidential status of mystical experiences is misguided because it rests
on too narrow a view about ways of knowing and about what can
count as evidence for belief in the divine.4 Although Marcel does
not develop an epistemology specific to the phenomenon of mystical
experience, he does argue for two very different approaches to reality
that correspond to two very different kinds of knowledge about reality.
We can either approach reality as composed of an infinite number of
problems to solve, or we can be open to the possibility that reality
contains at least some mysteries in which we can participate and that
we can embrace. According to Marcel, mysteries can be a source of
wisdom. Indeed, they can communicate a deep and profound
knowledge about the nature of reality and of human existence. I argue
that we ought to use Marcel’s epistemology of mystery to understand
the noetic quality of mystical experiences.
In the first section of this paper, I discuss the difference
between a problem and a mystery and explore how Marcel thinks we
acquire knowledge of each of these, respectively. In the second
section of the paper, I illustrate Marcel’s approach by applying it to
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two particular examples of mystical experience. The spiritual journeys
of both Augustine of Hippo and Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali
culminate in mystical union with God. This experience takes the form
of image-mysticism for Augustine and of fana, or annihilation, for AlGhazali. I argue that even though the content of their respective
mystical experiences differs, a similarity in their epistemic approach
can be discerned: each makes a transition from approaching God as a
problem to embracing God as a mystery. The lesson of their respective
spiritual journeys is that the knowledge of God that both of them
desire can only be conveyed through an encounter with God as
mystery. Marcel’s epistemology of mystery illuminates why and how
this is. In the final section of the paper, I defend my use of Marcel’s
framework to account for the noetic character of mystical experience
in general, and of these two figures in particular.
Before proceeding, I want to provide a working definition of
mystical experience and to make a few disclaimers about the scope of
my remarks. I use the term “mystical experience” to refer to those
experiences that have at least the following features or “marks,” as
William James puts it: (1) experiences of direct, personal encounter,
(2) experiences that have a noetic quality, i.e., that convey to the
subject some kind of insight or truth, and (3) experiences that are
ineffable, that cannot be accurately or wholly put into words, or
expressed in propositions.5 While not all mystical experiences are
religious, I mean in this paper to focus on a narrower class of
experiences that are both religious and mystical. Moreover, I focus on
a still narrower class of religious mystical experiences that come from
the major monotheistic traditions of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity.

1. Marcel’s Epistemology of Mystery
According to Gabriel Marcel, we can see in reality an indefinite
number of problems to solve as well as many mysteries to embrace.6
In this section, I discuss three features of what I call Marcel’s
epistemology of mystery. First, I clarify the distinction between a
problem and a mystery. Second, I explain the unique epistemic/moral
posture that one must assume in order to be open to the possibility of
mysteries and to acquire knowledge of a mystery. Third, I describe the
type of rational thought that one must use in order to reflect properly
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on the meaning of one’s encounters with mystery and to decipher
these mysteries.
There are at least three central features of a problem-oriented
approach to reality. First, a problem-oriented approach involves the
separation of the investigator from that which she investigates. When I
am faced with a problem to solve, “I work on the data, but everything
leads me to believe that I need not take into account the I who is at
work—it is a factor which is presupposed and nothing more.”7 In
approaching a problem, I force it to submit to the categories,
questions, and frameworks that serve my research goal. A second
feature of a problem is that it requires a solution and is eradicated
when a solution is found. Once the problem is solved, I can move on to
a different one. A third feature is that the solution to a problem takes
on a general or universal nature and is, at least in principle, publicly
verifiable. Where “we can get sufficient distance from our own
subjective, emotional, biographical selves in order to pose an objective
problem, we can in theory get an answer which will be verifiable by all
observers who will go through the appropriate procedures of
observation and testing.”8
A mystery may appear as a problem at first, but reflection
reveals that “in a genuine mystery the distinction between subject and
object, between what is in me and what is before me, breaks down.”9
As Marcel puts it, a mystery is a “problem which encroaches upon its
data, invading them as it were and thereby transcending itself as a
problem” (OM, 19). I cannot place myself wholly outside of a mystery
in order to investigate it, for there is no objective standpoint from
which I can observe it. There is no Archimedean point qua mystery.
Marcel uses the way we approach the study of reality itself to clarify
the distinction between problem and mystery. For example, when we
ask questions about the nature of reality or being, as the
metaphysician refers to it, we often begin by taking a problemoriented approach. We ask questions like “What is being?” and “Does
being exist?” but our expectation is not what it is when we are
investigating a problem. “Immediately an abyss opens under my feet:
I who ask these questions about being, how can I be sure that I exist?
(OM, 15–16). From a problem-oriented approach, the I (i.e., the
subject who is working on the “problem” of being) should be able to
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remain outside of the problem. Yet the more I reflect on the “problem”
of being, the more I realize that there is nowhere outside of being for
me to stand. I cannot separate myself from the object of my
investigation, i.e., being, in order to analyze and study it. Being is
presupposed by my ability even to formulate questions about it. This is
what Marcel means when he says that the problem “encroaches upon
its own data,” thereby “transcending itself as a simple problem” (OM,
19). When I ask questions about being, I cannot help but be asking
about my being and about my reality. This is to be in the presence of
what Marcel calls the mystery of being, or the ontological mystery
(OM, 16–18).
While problems are met with universal or generalized solutions,
mysteries do not admit of generalized solutions. We cannot secure a
solution to a mystery that can then be directly communicated to
others, and mysteries are not publicly verifiable. The only way to
“verify” both that something is a mystery, and the insight that
mysteries can convey is through direct personal encounter with
mystery. With “regard to the knowledge of a mystery every person
must begin anew. . . . There may be a witness in which one person
calls out to another and testifies to the meaning he has found in an
encounter” with mystery, but “there can be no direct transmission of
the creative assurance which such relations generate” (Keen, Gabriel
Marcel, p. 21). Subjective involvement and participation is essential for
gaining knowledge of a mystery.
Examples of mysteries include the meaning of life, freedom,
fidelity, and God. For example, in asking about the meaning of life, I
cannot help but be involved in the question and have a personal stake
in the answers that I discover. To pose a question about the meaning
of life as if it were a mere object to be analyzed is to act as if the
answers had no bearing on my own life. Yet surely the pursuit of
figuring out what makes human existence valuable and meaningful
bears tremendously on my particular existence (OM, 30). Questions
about the nature of reality or the meaning of life “can never be
decided on the basis of verifiable evidence which I can get apart from
my willing, feeling, and deciding self,” in the way that solutions to
problems can be so decided (Keen, Gabriel Marcel, p. 20).
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Marcel is not critical of the problem-oriented approach as such.
Scientific and technological advancement are important for helping us
cure illnesses, build bridges, fly airplanes, and so on. Rather, he
objects to the rampant misuse of a problem-oriented approach, which
he sees as increasingly characteristic of contemporary society (OM,
13). Marcel’s concern is that “intellectual and moral confusion results”
when a problem-solving approach to the world “becomes imperialistic
and claims the right to judge all knowledge and truth by criteria
appropriate only to the aspect of the objective” (Keen, Gabriel Marcel,
p. 19). There are at least two mistakes associated with a monopoly by
the problem-oriented approach to reality. The first is an
epistemological mistake. A problem-oriented approach simply will not
yield knowledge of mysteries. If it becomes the only or the dominant
method of inquiry for all domains, we are denied the opportunity to
know important truths that can only be conveyed through encounters
with mystery. The second problem involves a moral mistake. The
severe over-use of a problem-oriented approach to reality leads to
what Marcel calls a functionalized world. In a functionalized world
human beings tend to view themselves and others as reducible to their
functions: I am a ticket collector, a doctor, a wife. Personal identity or
who I am essentially becomes merely a matter of what I do (OM, 9–
12). The rampant misuse of a problem-oriented approach to reality
encourages us to treat everything, including human beings, as objects
or functions rather than as presences.
Marcel’s notion of presence is an essential aspect of the
epistemology of mystery and so requires some explication. Marcel
thinks that in order to approach reality as containing at least some
mysteries and to be open to the possibility that mysteries can be
sources of wisdom, one must be able to assume an epistemic/moral
posture of presence, which is quite different from the epistemic
posture one assumes for problem solving (OM, 38). To approach
another as a presence rather than an object is “to recognize him as a
person, a unique free subject, someone whom I would not simply call
‘he’ but would address more familiarly as ‘thou.’”10 In order to
participate in mystery, the knower must be open to the possibility that
some others may present themselves to her as presences rather than
as objects, and she must in turn be capable of being present to others.
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Marcel clarifies the notion of presence through the concepts of
availability and unavailability. When someone is present to me, she is
available to me in the sense that she is at my disposal when I am in
need or desire to confide in her (OM, 39). By “available” Marcel does
not mean that we should simply allow ourselves to be used by other
people. Rather, availability “involves responding in complete freedom
to a direct appeal” and “being receptive to an appeal addressed
directly to me as a person, not as an object.”11 Being available has
little to do with good intentions, or even with outward gesture or
behavior. “The most attentive and conscientious listener may give me
the impression of not being present; he gives me nothing, he cannot
make room for me in himself, whatever the material favours which he
is prepared to grant me” (OM, 40). For example, a highly competent
doctor may listen to my needs and never fail to order the appropriate
procedures or tests. Yet if I remain for her merely a diagnosis or a
disease to treat rather than a person, she is not present to me no
matter how capably she treats me. Presence is expressed in I-thou
relationships as opposed to I-it relationships, and one distinctive
feature of I-thou relationships is that they are reciprocal. “Presence
involves a reciprocity which is excluded from any relation of subject to
object or subject to subject-object” (ibid). Rather, presence expresses
a relationship of subject to subject and an intimacy that, for a
moment, blurs distinctions and boundaries between self and other.
On the contrary, to be unavailable or incapable of presence is to
be “in some manner not only occupied but encumbered with one’s own
self” (OM, 42). At the heart of being unavailable is a deep selfcenteredness, a preoccupation with the self that makes it impossible to
transcend the boundary between self and other. Marcel characterizes
this self-centeredness that prevents one from being available or
present as pride. Pride “consists in drawing one’s strength solely from
one-self. The proud man is cut off from a certain form of communion
with his fellow men” (OM, 32). Rather than approaching the other with
openness, allowing the other to reveal herself, the proud person takes
it upon herself to “create” the experience, to be in control of the
experience, to make it happen. Pride involves an inward turn whereby
a person tries to be totally self-reliant.
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One can contrast a problem-oriented approach and a mysteryoriented approach in terms of presence or lack thereof. When studying
a problem, I need not be present or personally available to the object,
the “it,” that I am investigating. Rather, I am self-reliant in creating
and directing the investigation, in order to discover the facts of the
matter through my own efforts and capacities. As an approach to
mystery, this simply will not do. In order to acquire knowledge of
mysteries, I must assume an epistemic posture of presence. I must
adopt an attitude of unknowing, and I must be somewhat vulnerable
to the other and patient, allowing space for the other to reveal herself
to me. Moreover, I must allow that I might be changed, or acquire
self-knowledge, in virtue of an encounter with mystery.
One of the most profound experiences of presence according to
Marcel is the experience of love. When I am in a genuinely loving
relationship I see the other as a gift, not as inevitable or arbitrary, but
as the result of an act of generosity.12 Love “does not experience the
beloved as a separate object” and “it refuses to reduce the other to a
collection of specifiable characteristics.”13 A loving relationship is not
experienced as created by me but as presented to me; it is a mystery.
I cannot understand or know love until I experience it, and when I do
experience it, I am granted profound knowledge about the value and
meaning of one important aspect of human existence. A pre-condition
for experiencing any mystery, including love, is an epistemic/moral
posture of presence whereby the ego must “break out of self-imposed
imprisonment and enter into fully personal relationships.”14
Even though knowledge of a mystery is experiential in the sense
that it can only be acquired through individual, personal experience
with mystery, and only by assuming an epistemic/moral posture of
presence, Marcel argues that it is also the “essence of the mysterious
to be approachable by a type of rational thought.”15 Reflection is
required for coming to know both problems and mysteries, but there
are two very different kinds of reflection that correspond to these two
very different aspects of reality. Marcel refers to the kind of rational
thought involved in knowing mysteries as secondary reflection. He
distinguishes secondary reflection from primary reflection, which is the
kind of rational thought involved in problem-solving. “While primary
reflection seeks to gain clarity about the world of abstraction,
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objectification, and verification, secondary reflection seeks a wider and
richer understanding of the meaning of human existence by a return to
the unity of experiences such as appreciation, fidelity, and faith within
which the mystery of being is apprehended.”16 Whereas primary
reflection seeks to dissolve the unity of experience in an act of
analysis, secondary reflection seeks to recapture or reclaim the unity
of experience; it is “recuperative.”
In order to illustrate the difference between primary and
secondary reflection, Keen considers the following example: When I
ask about the significance of my faith in God, primary reflection
searches for clarity by standing off from the experience,
abstracting and looking for universal explanations for faith. . . .
In all of this, however, an essential element of faith has been
left out. It is my faith that is being investigated. Secondary
reflection, therefore, will seek to recover the unity of experience
by asking from within the experience of faith what meaning it
has for me.17
In secondary reflection I do not stand outside of my faith experiences
to deconstruct and analyze them. Rather, through memory I gather
together the important experiences of my life and view them in a
unified way as my experiences. As I do so, I am also capable of
recognizing that I am not identical to my life, but that I am able to
take up a position with respect to my life without being entirely outside
of or separate from the experiences that constitute my life. For Marcel,
then, questions about whether or not it is rational to believe in God are
mysteries, not problems. Marcel was ambivalent about the traditional
proofs for God’s existence precisely because the proofs take a
problem-oriented approach to God: they treat God as an object and
aim to demonstrate the existence of this object.18 Even if this approach
can yield some intellectual beliefs about God for some people, Marcel
thought that the reason for the notorious inability for the proofs to
persuade non-believers was that the proofs actually presuppose faith.
That is, the proofs can only really confirm for believers what is already
given to them in faith experience.19 In contrast to this, Marcel’s
approach is phenomenological. In order to investigate questions about
God, philosophers should start from concrete human experience. The
divine is not experienced as an object or as a problem to solve, but
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rather as a mystery. The existence of God is not to be asserted as the
result of a syllogism, but the person of God is to encountered as a
“thou.”20 For Marcel, however, this does not mean that God is
unknowable. Mysteries are knowable, but only through personal,
concrete experiences in which the knowing subject assumes an
epistemic/moral posture of presence, and only by bringing secondary
reflection (as opposed to primary reflection) to bear on those
experiences.
Philosophical skepticism regarding the evidential status of
mystical experiences results, at least in part, from a monopoly by the
problem-oriented approach within contemporary epistemology.
Marcel’s epistemology of mystery offers an alternative, and in my view
better, framework for philosophical understanding of the noetic
character of mystical experiences. In the following section, I consider
two particular examples that illustrate the value of Marcel’s approach.
The spiritual journeys of both Al-Ghazali and Augustine of Hippo bear
out the Marcelian lesson that a problem-oriented approach to God is
misguided and remains insufficient for knowing God. Using Marcel’s
epistemology of mystery as an interpretive framework, I trace the
spiritual journeys of both Augustine and Al-Ghazali from skepticism,
through intellectual certainty, to mystical union with God.

2. The Spiritual Journeys of Al-Ghazali and
Augustine
Both Augustine’s Confessions21 and Al-Ghazali’s autobiographical
essay, the “Deliverance from Error,”22 can be characterized in Marcel’s
language as exercises in secondary reflection. Neither Augustine nor
Al-Ghazali abstracts from the particularities of their experiences in
order to produce generalizable solutions to the “problem” of mystical
experience. Rather, through acts of remembering each of them
recollects his experiences of the quest to know God, re-presents these
experiences in the text as a unified journey, and is able to take up a
position with respect to these experiences and to make judgments
about them, all the while standing within the experience. Thus, both
autobiographies begin where their respective spiritual journeys end,
with the lessons that each has learned about how to come to a
knowledge of God. Augustine states: “So too let him rejoice and
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delight in finding you who are beyond discovery rather than fail to find
you by supposing you to be discoverable” (I.10). Similarly, Al-Ghazali
states: “Whoever thinks that the understanding of things Divine rests
upon strict proofs has in his thought narrowed down the wideness of
God’s mercy” (DE, 24). Putting it in Marcel’s language, both figures
discover that God is not a problem to solve but a mystery to embrace.
I begin with an account of Al-Ghazali’s story and then turn to
Augustine.
Al-Ghazali’s autobiography begins as a treatise directed to those
who have asked him to testify about his journey through radical
skepticism, an investigation of the four classes of seekers, and
ultimately mysticism. He traces his journey from the “plain of naïve
second-hand belief to the peak of direct vision” (DE, 17). As a youth,
Al-Ghazali’s “thirst for the comprehension of things as they really are”
drove him to question all of the beliefs that he had taken on mere
authority. Inherited beliefs, he tells us, “ceased to hold me and . . .
lost their grip on me” (DE, 19). He noticed that the children of
Christians grew up Christian, the children of Jews grew up Jewish, and
so on. Moreover, he drew from the tradition related from the Prophet
that people are born with an original nature that is soun the
implication that it is parents and other adults who disrupt this
soundness by making children Jewish or Christian. These thoughts
inspired a deep desire to know “what this original nature really was
and what the beliefs derived from authority of parents and teachers
really were, and also to make distinctions . . . between the true and
the false in them” (ibid.). Al-Ghazali’s desire for knowledge becomes a
quest for certainty about what he believes, and it requires more than a
mere appeal to authority can provide. The goal was to achieve the kind
of knowledge in which “the object is disclosed in such a fashion that no
doubt remains along with it, that no possibility of error or illusion
accompanies it, and that the mind cannot even entertain such a
supposition” (DE, 19–20).
Initially Al-Ghazali adopts a problem-oriented approach to
knowledge of God. He begins by doubting all of those beliefs that it is
possible to doubt, including beliefs he has acquired from sense
perception and even beliefs about necessary truths. Yet, instead of
leading him to a secure foundation for knowledge, all of this doubting
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leads Al-Ghazali into a deep skepticism. He refers to his skepticism as
an illness or malady in which he doubts even the possibility of
knowledge. He is seriously disturbed by this state because he claims
that the only remedy is demonstration, and yet demonstration involves
combining first principles and necessary truths, and in his skeptical
state he denies even these. After about two months, Al-Ghazali
eventually “recovers” from this radical skepticism and decides that
acquiring knowledge of God is possible. Yet his approach to knowledge
of God is still noticeably framed by problem-solving.
Al-Ghazali’s next strategy is to investigate the four classes of
seekers. Each class claims to have knowledge of God, and so AlGhazali decides it is worthwhile to explore both what they claim to
know and how each class pursues knowledge of God. He considers
respectively the paths of theology, philosophy, the Bat iniyah, and
finally mysticism. Although Al-Ghazali finds theology important and
useful for its rather narrowly defined task of defending the Sunnite
creed and tradition from heretical attacks against the faith, he
nonetheless discovers that theology is insufficient for rationally
grounding belief in God. Theologians make explicit the contradictions
of their opponents but base “their arguments on premises which they
were compelled to admit by way of naïve belief, or the consensus of
the community, or bare acceptance of the Quran and Traditions” (DE,
28). Thus, the theologians cannot help the one who accepts nothing as
certain but necessary truths; they cannot provide the kind of certain
foundation for his beliefs that Al-Ghazali seeks.
Al-Ghazali turns next to the philosophers and proves to be, on
the whole, quite condemnatory of philosophy. Even though he thinks
that philosophy is capable of leading to certain foundational and
necessary truths about the natural world, he finds in all of the
philosophers a mixture of both truth and falsehood, primarily because
they all posit doctrines that contradict revealed knowledge. The
philosophers are dangerous because, “mingled with their teaching, are
maxims of the prophets and utterances of the mystics” and thus many
people who read them conclude uncritically that the philosophers must
speak the truth (DE, 43). Even though Al-Ghazali is not fond of
philosophy, he is even less fond of the Bat iniyah. The Bat iniyah are
the class of seekers who make claims to knowledge of the truth based
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on instruction from infallible Imams. At length, Al-Ghazali condemns
this group because they rely entirely on appeal to authority, an
authority that they cannot even demonstrate to be worthy of such an
appeal; they “have nothing to cure them or save them from the
darkness of mere opinions” (DE, 54). His dissatisfaction with these
three potential ways of seeking knowledge of God leads him lastly to
the mystics.
When Al-Ghazali begins his study of mysticism, he knows that it
differs from the other three paths in that it includes both intellectual
belief and practical activity, which aims at “getting rid of obstacles in
the self . . . and vicious morals, so that the heart may attain to
freedom from what is not God” (DE, 56). Al-Ghazali finds the
intellectual belief much easier to grasp and indicates that at this point
he remains more comfortable with taking a problem-oriented approach
to God. After reading all of the books of the mystics, he comprehends
“their fundamental teachings on the intellectual side” and progresses
“as far as possible by study and oral instruction, in the knowledge of
mysticism” (ibid.). Indeed at this point, Al-Ghazali claims to achieve
the intellectual certainty that he craves regarding the three essential
creedal principles of faith in God, in prophethood, and in the Last Day.
Yet the certainty that he eventually secures through a problemoriented approach to God remains deeply unsatisfying, and does not
move Al-Ghazali to act and to live the kind of spiritual life that he
desires to live. He soon realizes that the mystics seem to possess
knowledge of God that “cannot be apprehended by study, but only by
immediate experience . . . and moral change” (DE, 57). In Marcel’s
language, Al-Ghazali finally realizes that there is a kind of knowledge
about the divine that cannot be attained through problem-solving, but
only through an experiential encounter with the divine nature. AlGhazali draws an analogy to health: “What a difference there is
between knowing the definition of health . . . and being healthy”
(ibid.). Al-Ghazali realizes that there is a difference between knowing
definitions of God and creeds, and knowing God. God is a presence
rather than a problem, a “thou” to enter into relationship with rather
than an “it” to investigate.
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Moreover, he discerns that the knowledge of God that the
mystics possess requires moral change on the part of the seeker. He
must “sever the attachments of the heart to worldly things,” and this
can only happen by “turning away from wealth and position and
fleeing from all time-consuming entanglements” (DE, 58). To use
Marcel’s language, Al-Ghazali discovers that the kind of knowledge
that the mystics possess requires an epistemic/moral posture of
presence. He must become present, or spiritually available, to God by
“getting rid of obstacles in the self . . . and vicious morals, so that the
heart may attain to freedom from what is not God” (DE, 56). And yet
he remains unable to do so. He states:
I considered the circumstances of my life, and realized that I
was caught in a veritable thicket of attachments. . . . One day I
would form the resolution to quit Baghdad and get rid of these
adverse circumstances; the next day I would abandon my
resolution. I put one foot forward and drew the other back. . . .
Worldly desires were striving to keep me by their chains just
where I was, while the voice of faith was alling, “‘To the road! to
the road!” (DE, 59)
For six months Al-Ghazali “tossed” about in this state, unable to
become spiritually available to God until eventually he has what one
might describe as a severe mental and physical breakdown, for which
“the only method of treatment is that the anxiety which has come over
the heart should be allayed” (DE, 60).
Al-Ghazali’s initial inability to assume an epistemic/moral
posture of presence can be attributed, in Marcel’s language, to pride.
Al-Ghazali struggles to become present to God because he continues
to rely on himself to “create” a relationship with God and to have the
strength to turn away from the world; he remains encumbered with
himself and thus unavailable to God. It is not until Al-Ghazali realizes
that, left to his own devices, he simply cannot overcome this malady
and lead the life that he wishes to live until he finally begins to become
present to God. He states: “I sought refuge with God most high as one
driven to Him, because he is without further resources of his own”
(ibid.). In this moment of surrender, he begins to overcome his pride
by taking refuge in God and by being open to the possibility of
encounter with divine presence. The encounter occurs and is lifechanging. As Al-Ghazali states: “He made it easy for my heart to turn
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away from position and wealth, from children and friends” (ibid.). AlGhazali spends ten years in solitude, during which time he claims that
“there were revealed to me things innumerable and unfathomable”
(DE, 63). In attempting to describe the kind of knowledge conveyed in
his mystical encounters, he remarks: “it is hard to describe in
language; if a man attempts to express these, his words inevitably
contain what is clearly erroneous. In general, what [mystics] manage
to achieve is nearness to God” (DE, 64).
The spiritual journey that Augustine of Hippo recounts in his
Confessions is strikingly similar to Al-Ghazali’s spiritual quest.
Augustine’s search for knowledge of God is also a pursuit of certainty
in regard to what he believes. Augustine initially assumes a problemoriented approach to God that leads him first into a deep skepticism,
but eventually he comes to the secure foundation for his beliefs that
he craves. Like Al-Ghazali, Augustine discovers that what knowledge of
God he achieves through a problem-oriented approach remains deeply
unsatisfying because God is not an object to investigate but a subject
to love—a mystery.
As a youth, Augustine did well in school. Although he did not
always enjoy his studies, he did always “delight in the truth,” even in
the smallest of matters (I.31). While in Carthage, this initial love of
wisdom deepens and matures when Augustine is introduced to Cicero’s
Hortensius and Aristotle’s Categories. He claims that Cicero taught him
to love wisdom itself, wherever it might be found, rather than to
adhere dogmatically to particular scholars or schools of thought
(III.8). Augustine is so influenced by Aristotle that he tries to conceive
of everything that exists, including God, under the ten categories
(IV.29). Here it is quite clear that he assumes a problem-oriented
method of inquiry concerning questions about God. Augustine
approaches God as an object, an “it” to investigate through the
categories of philosophical analysis.
At Carthage Augustine becomes deeply influenced by the
Manichees, an affiliation he continues as he journeyed to Rome and
Milan. While in Rome, one “problem” that Augustine struggles with is a
version of the problem of evil. He wrestles with how the existence of a
single, infinitely good God might be made compatible with the
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existence of evil in the world. The Manichees offer a plausible solution
to this problem by holding that reality is fundamentally composed of
two substances, one infinitely good, the other infinitely evil, which
resolves the difficulty of attributing evil to one omnibenevolent creator
(V.20.). Augustine is not only won over by Manichee arguments about
the nature of the divine but also persuaded by the Manichees that
Catholic doctrines are false and that Catholic scriptures full of
contradictions and absurdities.
Augustine travels from Rome to Milan where he becomes
acquainted with Ambrose, who delivers what Augustine takes to be
tremendously compelling arguments against the Manichees. Ambrose
persuades Augustine that their arguments are unsound by interpreting
scripture in a way that resolves the apparent contradictions. Yet
Ambrose remains unable to provide the kind of certainty about
Catholic teachings that Augustine seeks. Augustine states: “I wanted
to be as certain about things I could not see as I am certain that seven
and three are ten. . . . I desired other things to be as certain as this
truth, whether physical objects or spiritual matters” (VI.6). Ambrose’s
arguments cannot provide this kind of certainty.
Consequently, though Augustine begins to question Manichee
doctrines, he remains unconvinced that he should accept Catholicism.
He states:
Granted it could have educated people who asserted its claims
and refuted objections with abundant argument and without
absurdity. But it was not sufficient ground to condemn what I
was holding. There could be an equally valid defence for both.
So, to me the Catholic faith appeared not to have been defeated
but also not yet to be the conqueror. (V.25)
This lack of certainty about any doctrine launches Augustine into a
deep skepticism about the possibility of gaining knowledge of God at
all. Augustine believes that God exists and cares for his creatures. Yet
he wants to understand the nature of God’s substance and to achieve
certainty in what he believes. His quest for this certain knowledge of
God, framed by a problem-solving approach, has led instead to radical
skepticism (VI.8.). He states: “Accordingly, after the manner of the
Academics . . . I doubted (V.25).
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After his encounter with Ambrose and his decision to suspend all
judgment, the first major turning point in Augustine’s spiritual journey
occurs through acquaintance with Platonic philosophy. Augustine
credits the Platonists with leading him even further down the “path
toward God” by teaching him to seek for wisdom in immaterial truth
rather than in the changing contingencies of this world: “after reading
the books of the Platonists and learning from them to seek for
immaterial truth I turned my attention to your ‘invisible nature
understood through the things which are made’” (VII.26). Indeed,
Augustine claims that his study of the Platonists eventually led him to
achieve the kind of intellectual certainty needed to ground his belief
and to live a life of faith: “I was certain that you are infinite. . . . I was
sure that you truly are, and are always the same; that you never
become other or different in any part or by any movement of position”
(VII.26). Yet, despite the intellectual certainty he achieves at this
point, he remains unmoved: “of these conceptions [of God] I was
certain but to enjoy you I was too weak” (ibid.). And again at the
beginning of Book VIII, “all doubt had been taken from me. . . . My
desire was not to be more certain of you but more stable in you”
(VIII.1). His intellectual doubts are completely quelled, and yet a
change of heart does not come. It is at this point that Augustine’s
language betrays his frustration most forcefully. He discusses the
absurdity he feels at having intellectual certainty about God and
yet remaining completely unmoved to live a life of faith in God
(VIII.1). Being now absolutely certain of the truths of Christianity, his
mind commands itself to believe and to make a total conversion, and
yet the mind that commands itself does not obey its own command.
He exclaims: “What causes this monstrosity, and why does this
happen?” (VIII.21). “I no longer had my usual excuse to explain why I
did not yet despise the world and serve you, namely, that my
perception of the truth was uncertain. But now I was indeed quite sure
about it” (VIII.11). What Augustine realizes at this point is that
intellectual knowledge of God is insufficient for conversion. He finally
discerns “the way which leads to the home of bliss, not merely as an
end to be perceived but as a realm to live in” (VI.26, emphasis mine).
Using Marcel’s language, we could say that Augustine finally realizes
that God is not a problem to solve or object to investigate (“an end to
be perceived”) but a mystery to embrace (“a realm to live in”). The
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knowledge of God that he seeks can only be had in an encounter with
the divine, which requires moral change. In Marcel’s terms, Augustine
realizes that he must assume an epistemic/moral posture of presence
and become available to God. Yet, left to his own devices, he remains
unable to engender the moral change required.
Augustine’s frustration peaks when he hears Ponticianus tell a
story about uneducated men who have followed the example of
Anthony and are ardent believers on fire with love for God. These
uneducated men have achieved what Augustine, with all of his
education and study, cannot achieve and this realization causes
Augustine to cry out in anguish. Augustine turns to his dear friend
Alypius and exclaims: “What is wrong with us? . . . Uneducated people
are rising up and capturing heaven . . . and we with our high culture
without any heart—see where we roll in the mud of flesh and blood”
(VIII.19). Augustine’s prolonged inability to assume an pistemic/moral
posture of presence required for genuine conversion can be attributed,
in Marcel’s language, to pride. Augustine remains encumbered with
himself and continues to rely on himself to “create” the experience of
God.
In this midst of this monstrosity, Augustine has a vision of Lady
Continence, who gently tells him that if he will only stop relying on
himself and “make the leap without anxiety, he [the Lord] will catch
you and heal you” (VIII.27). The vision reveals multitudes of people
who have “made the leap,” and Lady Continence gently admonishes
Augustine: “Are you incapable of doing what these men and women
have done? . . . Why are you relying on yourself, only to find yourself
unreliable” (VIII.27, emphasis mine). In Marcel’s terms, this vision
invokes Augustine to stop being so proud and to stop relying wholly
upon himself to “create” the conversion experience, but instead to
allow God to respond with love. Once Augustine overcomes his pride
and becomes open to the mystery of God, his monstrosity is
overcome. At this point, Augustine literally breaks down in sorrow. He
throws himself under a fig tree and lets his tears flow freely (VIII.28).
As he sobs, he hears a voice prompting him to pick up the scriptures
and read. He opens to a passage from Romans, and upon reading the
“first passage on which [his] eyes lit,” he states: “At once, with the
last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of relief from all anxiety
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flooded into my heart” (VIII.30). Shortly after this experience,
Augustine returns to Ostia to visit his mother. While in Ostia,
Augustine and his mother have a mystical encounter in which their
“minds were lifted up by an ardent affection towards eternal being
itself . . . to attain to the region of inexhaustible abundance” (IX.24).
He describes it as a direct encounter with wisdom, which he was able
to touch “in some small degree by a moment of total concentration of
the heart” (IX.29).
The mystical encounters of both Al-Ghazali and Augustine are
ultimately experiences of love in which even the duality of an I-thou
relationship is overcome as the self merges in union with God. For
Augustine, union with God is expressed in image mysticism in which a
trace, or image, of the trinitarian God is “seen” in the trinitarian soul of
the human being.23 For Al-Ghazali, union with God is expressed in fana
or annihilation in which the self literally becomes absorbed into God.24
Although the content of their mystical experiences differs, we may use
Marcel’s epistemology of mystery as an interpretive framework to
reveal that the epistemic/moral approach leading to these experiences
is the same: Augustine and Al-Ghazali both make a transition from
approaching God as a problem for resolution to embracing God as a
mystery, and in so doing each finally comes to know God. I do not
mean to suggest that approaching God as a mystery caused their
respective mystical encounters. Rather, their prolonged inability to
know God by approaching God as a problem to solve reveals the
inadequacies of a problem-oriented framework. Their respective
spiritual journeys affirm that God is a mystery, not a problem, and
that an epistemic/moral posture of presence is required in order for
one to acquire the wisdom available in a mystical encounter. The lives
of these two figures illustrate the usefulness of Marcel’s epistemology
of mystery for a philosophical understanding of the noetic quality of
mystical experience. However, a rigorous defense of Marcel’s approach
requires more than merely illustrating his framework through the lives
of two believers. In the following section, I defend the radical import of
Marcel’s epistemology of mystery for explaining the noetic quality of
mystical experiences in general, and of these two figures in particular.

3. A Defense of Marcel’s Epistemology of Mystical
Experience
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There is a pervasive skepticism within analytic epistemology
regarding the noetic quality of mystical experiences. One notable
exception to this tendency is to be found in the work of William Alston.
Remaining squarely within the frameworks of contemporary analytic
epistemology, Alston defends the evidential status of mystical
experience for grounding certain beliefs about God.25 Alston argues
that subjects who have mystical experiences are, on the basis of those
experiences, rationally justified in believing certain propositions about
God. His strategy is to demonstrate that Christian epistemic practice is
prima facie no less reliable than ordinary perceptual practice. Using
sense experience as the standard, he investigates the extent to which
the belief-forming practices of mystics measure up to this standard.
Alston concludes that, by and large, belief-forming practices on the
basis of mystical experience are epistemically comparable to beliefforming practices on the basis of ordinary sense perception. Insofar as
beliefs based on sense experience are rational, then in the absences of
significant defeaters, belief in God on the basis of mystical experiences
is also rational. One virtue of Alston’s approach is that he assume the
terms of the philosophical skeptic (at least those willing to take sense
experience as a paradigm of empirical knowledge) and attempts to
show how, using those terms, one can defend and explain the noetic
quality of mystical experiences. If this approach is successful, then
why posit the need for an alternative epistemology of mysticism that
relies on Marcel’s work? Alston offers a more moderate approach by
granting the skeptic’s relatively uncontroversial philosophical starting
points; Marcel does not, and instead presents a fairly radical shift to a
new epistemological framework. So why isn’t Alston’s strategy more
promising than Marcel’s approach, especially for persuading the nonbeliever or the skeptic?
Alston is operating within an empiricist framework that takes
propositional knowledge derived from sense experience as
paradigmatic. On his approach, questions about the noetic quality of
mystical experiences become questions about the extent to which a
subject is warranted in believing certain propositions about God on the
basis of these experiences. Indeed, Alston explicitly characterizes the
epistemic value of mystical experiences in terms of conveying
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important information about God. In the introduction to Perceiving
God, Alston states:
At the outset I should make it explicit that though I will be
concerned with the epistemic value of the perception of God, I
by no means suppose that to be its only, or even its most
important, value. From a religious point of view. . . . The chief
value of the experience of God is that it enables us to enter into
personal relationships with God. . . . But my topic in this book
will be the function of the experience of God in providing
information about God and our relations to Him.26
What I want to emphasize here is how Alston distinguishes the
epistemic value of these experiences from their personal value. Alston
assumes that the epistemic value of mystical experiences, while
obviously related to their personal value, can be separated out for the
purposes of analysis. For Alston, the epistemic value is the
propositions that one can garner from these experiences—information
about God—and his task is to show that one is justified in believing
certain propositions on the basis of these experiences. The personal
and religious aspects of mystical experiences, while important, are
distinct from the noetic aspects of these experiences, or if related to
the noetic aspects, they can and should be distinguished for the sake
of analysis.
By remaining firmly within the framework of traditional
empiricism, Alston treats mystical experiences as problems that
require a solution; he submits mystical experiences to the categories
of analysis that this tradition allows. While this strategy is a virtue of
his account in one respect, it is a significant weakness of Alston’s
approach in another respect, and in my view this latter aspect is more
important. The problem is that Alston’s approach does not capture
accurately the noetic quality of mystical experiences as reported by
the subjects who have them. The epistemic value of mystical
experiences is not that the subject comes to know about God, but
rather that the subject comes to know God. That is, the noetic quality
of mystical experiences cannot be separated from the personal,
relational aspects of these experiences: the epistemic value is in the
personal encounter, and the ability after the encounter to claim “I
know God,” and not just that “I know things about God.” It may be
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true that subjects come to affirm certain propositions about God on
the basis of mystical experiences. Yet the epistemic value of these
experiences is not reducible to (nor even primarily involving) the
acquisition of information about God. This is precisely what the
spiritual journeys of Augustine and Al-Ghazali reveal: the epistemic
value of their respective mystical experiences does not consist in
gaining more propositional knowledge about God, or even greater
certainty or justification for the propositions they already believed
about God. Indeed, their pursuit of propositional knowledge frustrated
their ability to know God. The epistemic value of their respective
mystical experiences was in coming to know God as a subject in an
encounter that altered dramatically the course of life for both of these
figures. Alston’s approach is limited because he remains within a
problem-oriented framework, and as such his analysis fails to capture
accurately the kind of knowledge that is conveyed in these
experiences. The lesson from the spiritual journeys of Augustine and
Al-Ghazali is that we need alternatives to “problem-oriented
epistemologies” in order to explain the noetic character of mystical
experiences because a fundamentally different kind of knowledge is
conveyed in these experiences than propositional knowledge of God.
Marcel’s epistemology is just such an alternative, and it can explain
the noetic quality of mystical experiences in the terms of the subjects
who claim to have them rather than in the terms of the philosophical
skeptics who doubt them.
However, trading in Alston’s analytic approach for Marcel’s
phenomenological framework may generate a second possible
objection. One might worry that my application of Marcel’s
epistemology of mystery to mystical experiences misappropriates his
framework. In order to see why, it is important to understand the
context within which Marcel discusses questions about the rationality
of belief in God. Marcel contends that it is within the scope of
philosophy to affirm rational belief in God, but that the strategy of the
traditional proofs is misguided. The proofs are ineffective because they
presuppose belief and because they rely on a kind of category mistake
by treating God as a problem that requires a solution. However,
mystical experiences are also not ideal starting points for a
philosophical discussion of the rationality of belief in God, as opposed
to a theological discussion, because these experiences are private,
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non-discursive, not universally experienced, and typically colored by
the particular creedal or faith-commitments of the subject. As Tom
Anderson notes, Marcel’s distinctive strategy is to ground the
rationality of religious belief in “nothing less than non-mystical
encounters with God,” which nonetheless involve a revelation of divine
presence.27 In short, Marcel’s epistemology of mystery is offered as an
alternative both to the traditional proofs and to mystical experiences
as ways of rationally grounding belief in God.
Marcel’s approach is phenomenological, and so he seeks to
ground belief in God in experiential encounters with divine presence.
Yet he aims to find common, universally available experiential ground
that even the non-theist could accept as a philosophical starting-point.
In this respect, then, Marcel’s approach does not seem so unlike
Alston’s strategy. The difference between the two is that Alston relies
on sense-experience and remains within a problem-oriented
framework. Marcel shifts the terms of the discussion by relying on a
fundamentally different kind of experience, the experience of mystery.
Yet mysteries, and the divine presence revealed in them, are not
reserved for the mystic or even just for the theist, but are central
aspects of ordinary human existence.
Thus, Marcel’s own philosophical discussion of how one might
come to affirm the existence of God through mysteries does not
emphasize mystical experiences where those are understood as direct
encounters with God. Instead, Marcel emphasizes that mysteries are
essential aspects of human life and are experiences with other human
beings through which God’s presence can be revealed. For Marcel, the
possibility of affirming God’s existence is open to believer and nonbeliever alike because certain fundamentally human experiences, e.g.,
love, fidelity, and promise-making, presuppose the existence of the
divine, the “Absolute Thou.” God is encountered in these experiences
through ordinary human interactions, for “we are aware of God’s
presence in and through the experience of that which is not God. . . .
The encounter with or experience of God, then, is mediated through
the experience of creatures. It is not an immediate ineffable
experience involving depth of insight into the ultimate nature of Being
as in mysticism.”28
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Moreover, Marcel distinguishes clearly between philosophy and
religion on the basis of the kinds of mysteries that are within their
scope. Religion “deals with mysteries, such as the Incarnation,
available only through revelation ‘which no effort of thought bearing
on experience can enable us to attain.’ Philosophy, however, deals
with mysteries ‘which are enveloped in human experience as such,’
and are therefore, accessible to philosophical reflection.”29 Thus, for
Marcel, the “presence of God, which the philosophers should recognize
and become witness of, is ‘enveloped’ in more mundane human
experiences” and does not involve particular creeds or religious
beliefs.30 In being concerned with mysteries that are “enveloped in
ordinary human experience,” it may seem that philosophy is not
particularly well-suited to investigate mystical experiences. So, on the
one hand, Marcel’s approach is preferable to Alston’s strategy because
the epistemology of mystery more adequately captures the kind of
knowledge that is conveyed in mystical experiences. On the other
hand, Marcel neither derives nor applies his framework to mystical
experiences, and indeed seems to offer the epistemology of mystery
as an alternative to mysticism for rationally grounding belief in God, at
least from a philosophical perspective.
There are at least three points that support my use of Marcel’s
epistemology of mystery to explain the noetic quality of mystical
experience from a philosophical perspective. First, while mystical
experiences are certainly not ordinary or common, they are
nonetheless experiences that human beings have. Unlike mysteries of
religious faith, such as the Incarnation, which “no effort of thought
bearing on experience can enable us to attain,” mystical experiences
do have a basis in human experience. Moreover, the difference
between the mediated revelation of divine presence through mysteries
of ordinary human life, and the immediate revelation of divine
presence through mystical experiences, is a difference in degree rather
than kind. The revelation of divine presence in experiences of human
relationships of love or fidelity is but a vague, unspecified, and
incomplete glimpse of the clear, definite, certain experience of divine
presence revealed in mystical encounters. Both are of divine presence
or Absolute Thou; the difference is in how, and the degree to which,
divine presence is encountered. Marcel’s own distinction between what

International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol 50, No. 2 (June 2010): pg. 221-241. Permalink. This article is © Philosophy
Documentation Center and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette.
Philosophy Documentation Center does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without the express permission from Philosophy Documentation Center.

24

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

we might call philosophical faith and religious faith underscores this
point.
Marcel distinguishes between “faith affirmations of God’s reality
which is philosophical in nature, which he calls ‘faith in general’ and . .
. a ‘concrete’ faith involving particular creeds, religious beliefs, or
ecclesiastical contexts.”31 Philosophical faith involves no particular
religious creeds or belief; it is “faith in general” and is available to
anyone who opens herself to the possibility of mystery and assumes
the kind of epistemic/moral posture required to experience the
mysterious in ordinary human life. In contrast, religious faith is
concrete and informed by particular creeds or beliefs, and often by
revealed truths that are not accessible through reflection on human
experience. However, for Marcel philosophical or “general faith” and
religious or “concrete faith” are both “the result of, and hence only
possible because of, revelation” of divine presence.32 A person does
not have to have “concrete faith” in order to have access to divine
presence. Thus, on Marcel’s account, the divine presence experienced
in mystical encounters, while certainly different in degree, and
different in the details, is not fundamentally different in kind from the
divine presence revealed in more ordinary human experiences of
mystery.
The third point is that the epistemic/moral posture of presence
and availability that makes one open to the possibility of mysteries in
ordinary human life is the same posture that makes one open to the
possibility of mystical experiences. It is true that mystical encounters
are sometimes reported to happen to a subject who may be previously
unavailable or closed to such possibilities. One might think here of St.
Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus. Yet for someone to
embrace the mystery revealed in a mystical encounter, rather than
being dismissive of or skeptical about it, requires that one assume an
epistemic/moral posture of presence and availability to the mysterious.
The subject of a mystical experience must still decide how to interpret
the experience and whether to accept it as a genuine experience or to
write it off as delusion. She must decide how to integrate the
experience with all the other experiences and encounters of her life.33
So, even though mystical experiences may be immediate and may
overwhelm a subject in the moment, in order for one to understand or
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accept that experience as revelation of divine presence requires an
epistemic/moral posture of presence that makes her at least open to
the possibility that reality contains mysteries. The upshot of all three
points is that the central features of ordinary mysteries are analogous
in important respects to the central features of extra-ordinary mystical
encounters of the divine, and thus, in my view, can be understood
philosophically through the same framework: the epistemology of
mystery.
One other possible line of objection to my use of Marcel’s
framework to account for the noetic quality of mystical experience
involves a long-standing debate over whether and to what extent we
can claim that mystical experiences are similar enough to consider
under a single category.34 My argument that we apply Marcel’s
epistemology of mystery to explain even a narrow class of mystical
experiences across the three monotheistic traditions assumes that
mystical experiences are in some sense comparable. In order for there
to be an epistemology of mysticism, we must be able to characterize
mystical experiences as more or less the same kinds of experiences.
Whereas the previous objection was over whether or not ordinary
mysteries and mystical experiences are comparable, this objection
concerns whether mystical experiences across traditions are
comparable.
Steven Katz has issued a forceful argument against this
possibility.35 Katz argues that mystical experiences across traditions—
and perhaps even within them—are incommensurable, and that the
belief that mystical experiences can be accurately captured under a
single category is false. The force of Katz’s position can be felt when
one considers that the particular details of mystical experiences across
traditions are, at best, radically diverse and, at worst, contradictory.
Even the two mystics whom I compare in this paper have seemingly
incompatible experiences of the divine: Augustine experiences a
Trinitarian God, whereas Al-Ghazali experiences annihilation as the self
being literally absorbed into God. Given such differences in the content
of mystical experiences across traditions, in what sense is an
epistemology of mysticism a legitimate project?
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One easy, and perhaps too easy, response is that this objection,
taken too far, falls back into treating mystical experiences as problems
that require a solution. Worries about whether or not mystical
experiences can be rigorously compared, assumes an approach
whereby inquirers stand outside of these experiences and analyze
them by breaking them into component parts in order to find some
kind of generalizable, universal content. We treat these personal
experiences of others like data by forcing them to submit to the
categories of our disciplines to see how well they fit. Yet if mystical
experiences are mysteries, then a problem-oriented approach will not
yield knowledge of them, and it will not do to raise objections from
within a problem-oriented framework. However, I think a more
substantial response is in order and can be offered.
It is true that the content of particular mystical encounters are
typically colored by the subject’s background beliefs and context.
Christians, for instance, often claim to have Christian mystical
experience, Muslims have mystical experiences colored by Islam, and
so on. Yet, this is not unlike encounters with mysteries in ordinary
human life. For example, no two experiences of love are alike in their
particular details. Moreover, the experiences of love by people from
diverse religious and cultural contexts will be colored by the
background beliefs that shape their particular tradition. In one sense,
then, experiences of mysteries in ordinary human life are not
comparable. Each person must begin anew, for mysteries cannot be
communicated through demonstration but can only be known through
concrete, personal experience. Yet the essence of mysteries, and the
revelation of divine presence that can be encountered in mysteries, is
in some sense the same. The similarities discerned from the testimony
of those who encounter mysteries in ordinary human experiences is
not offered as irrefutable proof either of the existence of the divine or
that the divine has certain properties. Rather, such testimony is
offered as a “witness, in which one person calls out to another and
testifies to the meaning he has found in an encounter.”36 So too in the
case of mystical experiences: mystical experiences often take the
shape of particular religious creeds or traditions. An epistemology of
mystery applied to mystical experience is not meant justify a particular
view of God. Nonetheless, testimony from those who have these
experiences reveals some similarities in experience. One important
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similarity in testimony about mystical experiences across traditions is
“the conviction that there is a reality, a profound meaning, behind the
world of appearances.”37 That is, one similarity in experience is that
mystical encounters are noetic. Marcel’s epistemology of mystery
provides a framework for understanding the kind of knowledge
conveyed in these experiences, and the epistemic/moral posture one
must be willing to assume in order to acquire this kind of knowledge.

4. Conclusion
Even though Marcel does not develop an epistemology specific
to mysticism, his epistemology of mystery provides a radical new
framework for understanding the noetic quality of mystical experiences
as reported by the subjects who claim to have them. Marcel’s
framework improves on contemporary analytic approaches because it
captures more accurately the kind of knowledge that mystical
experiences convey. Moreover, applying his epistemology of mystery
to mystical experience is perfectly consistent with Marcel’s own
philosophical discussions of the rationality of belief in God. Most
importantly, however, revitalizing Marcel’s epistemology of mystery
and extending it in new directions helps resist the monopoly of a
problem-oriented approach to all domains of inquiry. Marcel’s
epistemology of mystery is valuable because it broadens our
understanding of the kinds of knowledge that are possible, and that
should be desirable, given the complexity and profundity of human
life.
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